

Assessment of the Socio-Economic Effects of Military Operation against Boko Haram Terrorism in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria

Anthony Abah Ebonyi

Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Science, University of Abuja, Nigeria
Corresponding Author: Anthony Abah Ebonyi

Abstract: Boko Haram terrorism started effectively in 2009 in the north-east and since then has continued with many lives lost and properties destroyed. The Nigerian government responded to the phenomenon through its military. Apparently the military's operation against the terrorists has also inadvertently worsened the situation. In light of this, this research sought to examine the socio-economic effects of the military's operation in Maiduguri, one of the cities in the north-east mostly affected. The study considered the relative deprivation and routine activity theories but adopted the conflict theory as its main theoretical thrust. Primary data were collected through survey questionnaire, In-depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion. The questionnaire was administered on a cross-section of the sampled population, using stratified sampling technique, while Participants for both the IDI and FGF were selected via purposive sampling technique. The primary data were supported with secondary data from online journal articles, newsmagazines, newspapers, agency publications, and relevant books. Findings revealed that the military counter-terrorism operation against Boko Haram terrorists in Maiduguri negatively affected the local population which made them to lose confidence and trust in the military. The study further revealed that military colluded with some politicians with the aim of perpetuating the crisis. The study concluded that even though military operation against Boko Haram has recorded some appreciable level of achievements in reducing the rate of attacks by the terrorists, their (military) actions have met with serious disapproval from the local population because of the negative effects on their lives. Consequently, the study recommended among others that the Federal Government should constitute a task force that would periodically monitor the activities of military including the ranks and file; and those found wanting be commensurably punished.

Keywords: Military Operation, Boko Haram, Terrorism

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I. INTRODUCTION

Boko Haram has carried out several terror attacks in the North-East of Nigeria since 2009 when it adopted violent approach. Using suicide bombing as *modus operandi*, it has killed many civilians and military personnel and destroyed property including military installations (UNHCR, 2017). The government responded by deploying the military to the affected states especially Maiduguri, in Borno State, the area most hit by Boko Haram terrorism with intent to contain the violence.

The deployment of the military to combat the Boko Haram terrorists might be an unavoidable necessity judging from the scale of violence perpetrated by the terrorists, but the military has been accused of impropriety involving serious human rights violations, mass murder, extra-judicial killings, physical abuse, secret detentions, extortions, burning people's homes, and stealing money during raids, among others (Oarhe, 2013). While there were many consequences resulting from the Boko Haram terror attacks, the most serious but often less mentioned is the socio-economic effects the military operation has had on the people of Maiduguri. It is the socio-economic effects of the military's action against Boko Haram on the people of Maiduguri that this study sought to investigate.

Terrorism is a debilitating global phenomenon. The scourge has in this century more than any other, not only claimed hundreds of thousand lives and destroyed properties, but also like an axe in its handler's hand, hewed the foundation of human co-existence. Terrorism has created suspicion between nations and amongst peoples of diverse nationalities. The menace has also threatened the internal and external security of countries in both northern and southern hemispheres (United Nations, 2008).

The event of September 11, 2001 in the United States of America launched a new chapter in the history of terrorism. It opened the eyes of the international community to the capability of terrorists to carry out deadly and catastrophic attacks on their targets wherever and whenever. Consequently, world leaders and scholars have made spirited efforts to look for ways (counter-terrorism measures) to detect and prevent terrorist acts around the world, one of which is the deployment of military personnel to affected areas (Mogan, 2004).

The act of terrorism is not new. It started from when people began to disagree over issues pertaining to the economy, politics and religion. It could be argued that terrorism is synonymous with the history of civilization. One of the earliest recorded acts of terrorism was during the first century A.D in the Roman provinces of Israel (Whittaker, 2004). It was an episode when the Jewish Zealots rebelled against the Roman authority and their allies who occupied Jewish ancestral land. In the same century, the Assassins, devotees of a Muslim cult known as the *Shi'ite Order of Assassins* also engaged in violent acts of terrorism to expel Christians who invaded Palestine during the eleventh and twelfth century crusades. The Assassins who were suicide bombers believed that their suicide acts made them martyrs and guaranteed them a place in Paradise (Whittaker, 2004, Ikezue and Ezeah, 2015). This trend continues till today with contemporary terrorist organizations around the world having as their *modus operandi*, suicide bombings of enormous proportions and attendant consequences.

According to Bakker and Boer (2007), the emergence of Al-Qaeda in the late 1980s introduced a fresh phase in contemporary terrorism. Since then, Al-Qaeda has become the launch pad for current terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Islamic State of Iraq and Lavent (ISIL) and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (together referred to as IS); Al-shabaab of Somalia, and Boko Haram of Nigeria.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study was to examine the socio-economic effects of military operation against Boko Haram on the lives of the people of Maiduguri, Borno State. Both Boko Haram terror attacks and the military operations aimed at combating the terrorists have disrupted the lives of the residents of Maiduguri in certain key socio-economic areas.

According to Human Rights Watch [(HRW) (2016)], in attempts to combat the Boko Haram terrorism in Maiduguri, the military had been indicted for abusing the people it was set out to protect some of whom included teachers. It reported that overall, the negative acts of the military personnel resulted in the closure of schools, panic withdrawals of students from schools, and low school enrollment.

Another report by the Human Rights Watch showed that the military made use of schools as their base, and when Boko detected the presence of the military, they went there to attack. As a result, some local persons justified the presence of the military in the schools as it helped to dispel students' fears of Boko Haram attacks (HRW, 2016). However, the conduct of the military was said to have defeated the objective of combating the Boko Haram terrorism in the area, as it was discovered in some cases where military personnel entered a village, got drunk, and took women to the school to sleep with them. Eye witnesses testified that Boko Haram members saw this despicable act and went to attack the schools in a bid to get at the soldiers (HRW, 2016).

Reports by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have indicated how vulnerable groups such as women and children were prone to abuses by security personnel in the Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) camps across Maiduguri. It noted that patriarchal culture of the people put women at a socio-economic disadvantage and therefore compounded their situation (IOM, June, 2017).

Further, the military has detained persons suspected to be members of Boko Haram, under inhuman conditions thereby leading to the death of such persons while in custody. Hundreds of persons have also been extra-judicially executed by the military while in detention facilities or upon arrest. Generally, the military has unlawfully arrested, tortured and detained persons suspected to be sympathizers of Boko Haram, without charging them to court (Amnesty International, 2015). Nonetheless, the military authorities have denied most if not all the allegations describing them as mere allegations concocted to discredit the military (Agbibo, 2013).

Findings from researches conducted by other notable scholars and Non-Governmental Organizations (Osakwe & Audu, 2017; HRW, 2013 & 2016; Umar, 2013), showed that the military performed creditably well in some areas, but also got involved in some unwholesome practices or actions such as rape, torture, arrest and, on occasions, extra-judicial killings of innocent civilians in Maiduguri. For example, Osakwe and Audu (2017) conducted a research in which they found that "the response from the military JTF was characterized by indiscriminate and excessive use of force." They cited instances where the military set homes and shops on fire in areas where terror attacks had occurred; in addition to shooting and arresting people indiscriminately. They noted that "once JTFs formation, convoys or check points came under Boko Haram attack the security agents would open fire and burn indiscriminately anything that was in their way with less concern for the effects on lives and property" (Osakwe and Audu, 2017).

Until this current research, there has not been any empirical and systematic study conducted to examine the effect of the military operation employed by the Nigerian government to counter Boko Haram terrorism particularly in Maiduguri, the Borno State Capital. Therefore, there is paucity of literature examining the subject in terms of the social and economic effects of the military's actions on the people. This study will fill the gap by examining the operation of the military and how it has affected the people of Maiduguri in Borno State, Nigeria.

III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study provided answers to the following research questions:

- i. How did Boko Haram Terrorism emerge?
- ii. What are the social effects of Boko Haram Terrorism?
- iii. What are the economic effects of Boko Haram Terrorism?

IV. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

Generally, this study sought to assess the socio-economic effects of military operations against Boko Haram Terrorism in Maiduguri. Specifically, the paper aimed to:

- i. Investigate the emergency of Boko Haram Terrorism?
- ii. Assess the social effects of military operation against Boko Haram Terrorism?
- iii. Assess the economic effects of military operation against Boko Haram Terrorism?

V. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Emergency of Boko Haram Terrorism

Boko Haram emerged in 1995 in Maiduguri, the Capital of Borno State in present-day North-East under the name "Sahaba" and leadership of Abubakar Lawan. He later relinquished leadership of the then group to Mohammed Yusuf, to pursue a study programme in the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015).

Mohammed soon after assuming leadership of the Boko Haram, treaded a different path as he introduced new and radical Islamic religious teachings that included a complex of school and mosque that enrolled children of the poor from Nigeria and neighbouring countries, who received the new doctrines. The complex duo of school and mosque has branches in other states of Yobe, Gombe, Katsina, Bauchi and Kano. Later on Mohammed Yusuf moved the headquarters of the new Islamic sect to his hometown in Kanamma, in Yobe State, Nigeria, at the border with Niger Republic. There, he formed a militant base known as "Afghanistan" (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015).

According to Asfura-Heim & McQuaid (2015), in 2008, Yusuf's hitherto peaceful religious sect started a campaign of militancy or terrorism against the government of Nigeria, by storing small arms and light weapons at its base in Maiduguri and Bauchi. Consequently, on 11th June, 2009, during a funeral of one of its members, Yusuf's group defiled a government law which introduced the use of Motor cycle helmets in the city of Bauchi. The Police, who saw it as a challenge to their authority engaged the group in a show of force which resulted in the death of about 800 members of the sect members, and the subsequent arrest, torture and execution of Mohammed Yusuf, along with his father-in-law and some Boko Haram members.

Ostebo observed that after the demise of Mohammed Yusuf, a new leader named Abubakar Shekau emerged. Shekau's leadership led to the recognition of Boko Haram as an international Jihadist terrorist group which employed terrorist tactics such as suicide bombings, the use of Improvised Explosives Devices (IEDs), target assassinations, as well as kidnapping and hostage taking. (as cited in Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015). This trend has continued till date, leading to the deployment of military personnel and hardware by the federal government of Nigeria, for the purpose of fighting the Boko Haram terrorists. To this extent, the actions of the military have had sever repercussions for the people of Maiduguri, who have had to bear the brunt of the conflict between the military and the Boko Haram terrorists.

2. Socio-Economic Effects of Military Operations against Boko Haram Terrorism

There have been several social and economic effects of the military operation against Boko Haram which have attracted the attention of scholars and some international agencies such as the Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Organization on Migration (IOM), among others. Some of them are discussed in this section of the study. In the context of military operations in Maiduguri, there have been numerous allegations of human rights violations by security forces that had gone to affect the socio-economic lives of people in several areas.

The military exercise of the JTF has impacted on education in Borno State. For example, the military made use of schools as their base, and when Boko detected the presence of the military, they went there to

attack, leaving scores of people killed and injured. In what might appear as support for the military's action, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that some local persons justified the presence of the military in the schools as it helped to dispel their (students') fears of Boko Haram attacks (HRW, 2016).

However, it was also reported that the conduct of the security forces has defeated the objective of safeguarding students as it was discovered in some cases where the military personnel would enter the village, get drunk, and took women to the school to sleep with them. Eye witnesses testified that Boko Haram members saw this despicable act and went to attack the schools in a bid to get at the soldiers (HRW, 2016). This scenario, it appears could be viewed as "conflict within conflict". While the Nigerian State through the military is involved in one conflict with the terrorists, the soldiers too were engaging in human rights abuses as reported above by HRW, in contravention of their mandate as well as conventions on human rights. The findings by Osakwe and Uudu (2017) on the negative actions of the military during operations on Boko Haram supported this line of argument.

Additionally, HRW (2016) reported "In operations to counter Boko Haram, government security forces have also been implicated in abuses against civilians, including teachers in formal and religious schools . . ." In a report submitted to the *Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women*, in November 2016, Human Rights Watch noted:

The use of schools for military purposes affects girls and women negatively. In addition to disrupting the right of children to education, troops occupying schools expose students and teachers to risks such as unlawful recruitment, forced labor, beatings, and sexual violence. Furthermore, girls are particularly vulnerable as fear of sexual violence often causes girls to drop out of school (HRW, 2016).

Overall, the negative acts of the military personnel had resulted in the closure of schools, panic withdrawals of students from schools, and low school enrollment.

The consequences of the military operation against Boko Haram on the people, has caught the attention of, local and international agencies, especially the International agencies. In the area of health, for example, the International Organization for Migration 2016 report observed that lack of qualified personnel, drugs, and inadequate medical facilities have affected the delivery of quality healthcare to the IDPS in Maiduguri. Reporting on the health status of the population, it indicated that 11% of the displaced households in the newly accessible areas reported cases of chronic illnesses such as diabetes, HIV/AIDS among the female population resulting from rape by terrorists and military personnel, hypertension, and some critical health conditions associated with being displaced (IOM, June, 2017).

The conflict between Boko Haram and the JTF otherwise referred to in this study as military operation against the Boko Haram terrorist Group in Maiduguri, has impacted on the food and nutrition of the civilian population in the area. As at December 2016, the IOM reported that some local government areas including Maiduguri had experienced food insecurity resulting in at least one in five households who had faced food consumption shortages. It concluded that as of October of the same year, there were more than 3 million people in Borno State in need of food assistance. This situation according the report had led to the available food being controlled and rationed by the government so as to deter Boko Haram from gaining access to food supplies that were met for the IDPs needs (IOM, June, 2016).

The shortfall in food supplies meant a cut in the nutritional needs of the IDPs. IOM (June, 2016) report showed nutrition emergencies in Maiduguri including other newly accessible areas. It stated that "the proportion of children indicating Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) ranged from 20 to 50%, reflecting an "Extreme Critical" situation and significantly increased risk of child mortality. It cited a case in Magumeri where, 5% of children suffered from Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM), and an additional 25% suffered from Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM).

Similarly a report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) revealed that as of November of 2016, 46% of IDP households in eight of the newly accessible areas mentioned above lacked sufficient livelihoods. For example, in some communities, farming and fishing activities were restricted because of the prevailing military activities. It noted that the military actions have significantly reduced crop production, thereby limiting income generating opportunities of the IDPs and impacting on their economic and social lives, drop in food supplies. It was reported that the vulnerability of the local population to malnutrition, arising from poor harvest, had limited access to markets and contributed to low resources (Edwards, J., 2017).

Maiduguri has been the commercial nerve centre of northeastern Nigeria dating back to pre-colonial times. It is still the major trading hub for the entire northern Nigeria. However, frequent bombings and clashes between Boko Haram terrorists and the military in Maiduguri have had a devastating effect on commercial and business activities such as banking and trading in Maiduguri Metropolitan area. Banking activities were adversely affected by the military operation against the Boko Haram terrorists to the extent that banks had to reduce their service hours to avoid being attacked by terrorists (Mbaya, Waksha and Wakawa, 2017).

Marketers especially those trading in food stuff lamented on the shortage in food supply because of restrictions on movement. ACAPS reported that markets in Maiduguri city were open; however, there was serious drop in

food supply with attendant high prices. This was attributable to decreased local food production and security restrictions imposed by the military (ACAPS Briefing Note, 2017).

A report by the United Nation's Security Council, noted that between January 2013 and mid-2015, military operations seriously restricted access and the provision of humanitarian assistance to conflict affected children and their families due to restrictions on movement. It added that the declaration of a state of emergency also resulted in the partial blockage of movement for humanitarian personnel and relief items. This overall implication of the security situation was that the UN and other humanitarian organizations had to suspend their humanitarian activities from December 2013 to March 2015 (UN, 2017).

A study carried out by Mercy Corps in 2017 found that military restrictions affected the flow of goods across borders and within North-East Nigeria thereby significantly curtailing agricultural outputs and sales opportunities. The report indicated that despite the challenge, the Transport Union developed a good rapport with the military which had enabled their vehicles to move freely without harassment at checkpoints. It pointed out that soldiers on occasion helped them to fix their broken down vehicles to prevent potential attacks from terrorists.

According to the report by Mercy Corps (2017), transporters acknowledged that occasionally the military is their only source of information on security checkpoints and roadblocks, even though the military officials at checkpoints do not always have the latest information, as they had to rely on orders from the higher officials. At times, too, some business owners had to signed formal registers with the security personnel to allow ease of movement.

3. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework adopted for this study will be the Conflict Theory. However, other theories, such as the relative deprivation theory, and routine activity theory, have been adduced by some scholars as basis for explaining terrorism and military Counter-terrorism operation.

Relative deprivation theory was first enunciated by Gurr in the 1970s (Victoroff, 2005). The theory assumed that economic disparities predispose an individual to violent act. According to Gurr, there is a "perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities". Therefore, deprivation would usually occur when an individual's value expectations (such as welfare, security, self-actualization, and self-esteem) exceed his value capabilities. Gurr maintained that the intensity and scope of relative deprivation strongly correlate the potential for collective violence. Towards this end, Gurr concluded that frustration aggression accounted for "primary source of the human capacity for violence (Hastings, 2008).

Nasser-Eddinne et al., (2011) stressed that the theory is based on the conception that socio-economic indices such as poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment, low educational attainment trigger off frustration thereby predisposing an individual to violence or radicalization. However, an individual or group is said to feel deprived only in comparison to another similar individual or other similar groups, or when his/its expectations are not met. Hence, it is the feeling of being deprived that matter, not the fact that someone or some persons are being deprived or denied opportunities to achieve their goals or objectives per se (Haralambos & Holborn, 2013; Igbo, 2008). This explains why some individuals who feel deprived do not take to violence as a last resort even when they are factually deprived' thus, the *relativity/relativism* in relative deprivation theory. Relative deprivation, therefore, is a subjective rather than an objective feeling that results in a subjective and rational choice of action.

In relation to terrorism, it has been argued that even though poverty, unemployment, low educational attainment, and other socio-economic variables may play a role in some political or religious violence, relative deprivation was not enough to explain terrorism acts or why individuals join a terrorist organization (Victoroff, 2005). This fact, therefore, has made military operation a rather challenging or difficulty campaign as steps taken to pacify the terrorists through dialogue have failed because of the subjective feeling of being deprived held by the group. The refusal to dialogue with the government has made the military to continue to apply its coercive apparatus to try to combat the Boko Haram terrorists in Maiduguri.

Routine activity theory is a sociological approach that seeks to explain crime "as a product of the combined result of three essential elements" which include, *potential offenders or persons who are motivated to commit crimes; suitable targets, that is, the presence of things that are of some economic value and which can be easily transported; and absence of capable guards or persons who can prevent a crime from taking place* (Igbo, 2008). The proponents of routine activity theory have argued that these three critical elements must come together under one given situation for crime to actually take place; the absence of any of which might inhibit or prevent crime.

According to Igbo (2008), routine activity theory is concerned not with the factors or conditions that make a person to commit crime, but rather is about how the normal, every-day, lawful and routine activities of an individual or group may increase the probability of criminal activities or actions. However, for this situation to arise, the *presence of suitable targets* and the *absence of capable guards* or persons who would prevent or put

a check on the criminal agent must be present together. This implies that crime is preventable if there is *presence of capable guards* and *absence of suitable targets*, in addition to *potential offenders or person who are motivated to commit crimes*.

Going by the assumptions of Routine Activities theory, terrorists are potential offenders who rationally choose their targets as they find them available or lying around, and then strike accordingly and proportionally. The absence of suitable guards or persons (such as the military) enables them to easily succeed in their missions. Thus, the application of maximum force by the Nigerian military to tackle Boko Haram terrorism became an option. It is the view of this study that both theories above do not sufficiently address the subject matter of the study.

As mentioned above, this study will adopt the Conflict Theory as basis for explaining and understanding the military operation against Boko Haram terrorism in Maiduguri. Conflict is unarguably a feature of all societies. Conflict according to Galtung (1973) is “actors in pursuit of incompatible goals.” The “goals” are personal and often time selfish interests such as power, wealth, and other economic value or resource. Conflict theory as a sociological paradigm made its way into the vocabulary of the social sciences with the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the early to mid 19th century (Yakkaldevi, 2014).

According to Marx conflict is part of the structure of the society. It determines and governs relationships of production. As such, it divides human beings into two classes, the rich and the poor (i.e. the haves and the have not). He argued that the rich own the means of production while the poor or masses serve or slave at the mercy of the rich as labourers who earn non-commensurate wages for their labour. This unequal and exploitative relationship breeds antagonism or conflict.

The Marxist theory of conflict holds that the unequal relationship that exists between the rich and the poor classes necessarily leads to constant struggle. However, in this struggle, those who have the financial muscle control both the state and the poor. Hence, the Marxists (including Lenin) posit that “the state is itself a product of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms” (as cited in Folarin, n.d). According to Folarin (n.d) “the central argument of Marxism is thus that capitalism is at the heart of the state, and that same capitalism is exploitative and oppressive and has been responsible for the polarization of the society (and state) into two incompatible classes” . This is the class that exploits and the one that is exploited. Yakkaldevi (2014) noted that the two ways the capitalists exploit the masses was through brute force perpetrated by the police and the army, and economics.

Thus, structural conflict theorists (Ross; Scarborough; Galtung) argued that conflict is the direct result or consequence of the way and manner society is structured and organized; which is based on inequality and exploitation of one class or group (proletariat) by another (capitalist). They maintained that poverty, injustice and exploitation precipitate conflicts in any given society (as cited in Ahmadu and Ayuba, 2016).

Other scholars (Ugwu, 2000; Imobighe, 2003; Nnoli, 2003; Afegbua, 2010; Anugwom, 1997; Dhrendorf, 1976) have all written on conflict and its dynamics. These scholars averred that conflict was a phenomenon common to all organizations. It usually arose from opposing views and interests held by individuals and groups. Dhrendorf and Anugwon argued that conflict was at the basis of societal dynamics. It played out in industrial relations where participants, that is, management and labour tried to outsmart each other for selfish gain. Anugwom specifically reiterated that while management is profit conscious, labour pursues wages consciousness. This struggle will eventually result in one party dominating at the detriment of the other.

Conflict theory has been criticized as being short-sighted and one-sided-looking (Folarin, n.d). It fails to address the plurality and diversity in human society, the kind that enhances unity and strength. For example, the differences in ethnicity and religion in Nigeria could actually be a source of strength and unity if properly harnessed. However, the inability of the ruling class or elite to appropriate these differences has resulted in the current conflict or terrorism situation in Maiduguri, Borno State and the need for its annihilation as seen in the military operations of the government.

In light of the above analysis, the glaring and brazen quest for material possessions, power and the predisposition to rule and dominate by the few elites particularly in the north of the country, against the wishes of the powerless majority, has made the conflict theory relevant to this study. It is within the contending viewpoints above that this study will ascertain the extent to which the conflict theory will provide reasonable explanations to military counter-terrorism operation against Boko Haram terrorism in Maiduguri.

Applying the conflict theory, as viewed from the Marxian perspective, to the study, it could be argued that from the onset, the social structures of the Nigerian State have inherent internal contradictions that have made the conflict in the northeast unavoidable. The Nigerian society has been such that a few people are extremely rich and wealthy, while the majority is pathetically poor. It is such disparity in class and status that Boko Haram has cashed into and used to perpetrate its dastardly terrorist acts in the Maiduguri.

Between the government or military and the Boko Haram terrorists, there is a conflict. This conflict is hinged on incompatible goals or interest. On one hand, the terrorists sought a change in the status quo; they wanted to replace the Western capitalist and secularist structure with an Islamic one guided or governed by

sharia law. On the other, the military or government would stop at nothing to maintain the existing structure, that which hitherto was seen by Boko Haram as unjust and corrupt. On this point, Ahmadu and Ayuba (2016) reckoned “. . . internal factors such as, lack of good governance that metamorphosed into economic decay, destitution, exclusion and poverty made Boko Haram radicalization congenial to strive”.

The *wages or justice-seeking* Boko Haram is diametrically opposed to the *profit-status quo maintaining* government; hence the conflict that is being witnessed today as terrorism in Maiduguri, Borno State and the military counter operation that has followed on its heels.

Based on the above analysis, and drawing further on the analysis made by (Egbue, Nwankwo & Alichie, 2015), this study applied conflict theoretical framework to argue thus:

- i. Boko Haram terrorism in the north-east is a consequence of conflict within the elite class generated by divisions and incompatible goals or interests.
- ii. The elite class which includes the military echelon manipulates other social divisions like ethno-religious cleavages to promote their economic and political interests.
- iii. The political class also takes advantage of inherent deprivation and poverty among peasant class to advance their interests. For example, when the need arose the elite employed religious sentiments and material inducements to mobilize members of the peasant class (such as the *almajiri*) as foot soldiers of terrorism, to feather their political and economic nests. This point was amplified by Ogunrotifa (as cited in Egbue, Nwankwo & Alichie, 2015) who observed that Mohammed Yusuf and the Boko Haram ideology capitalized on the frustration of the peasant class in Northern Nigeria to champion its campaign of terror.

VI. METHODOLOGY

This study combined quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative method involved survey research using questionnaire, while the qualitative method adopted In-Depth Interview (IDI) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD).

The sample size for this study was determined by the study population which is 540,016 (according to the 2006 Population Census). The sample size was obtained by using Taro Yamane (1967) formula as follows:

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2}$$

Where:

n = Sample size

N = Total Population size (540016)

e = Confidence interval at 95% (0.005%)

Using the formula above:

$$n = \frac{540,016}{[1 + 540,016 (0.005)^2]}$$

$$n = \frac{540,016}{1350.0425}$$

$$n = 399.9992592825781$$

$$n \approx 400$$

Therefore the sample size for the study was 400 as calculated above.

The survey research was adopted to elicit responses from the respondents on the socio-economic effects of Military operation against Boko Haram in Maiduguri. It also elicited demographic information on the respondents' age, gender, marital status, education, occupation, religion and ethnicity. The population was divided clearly according to the number of wards in MMC. A random sample was then taken from each ward using stratified sampling technique. Participants for the survey were selected from each stratum (ward) through lottery method. At the end same number of participants was drawn from each ward (stratum) regardless of the number of people in it. This was to ensure that each ward had equal opportunity of representation in the sample.

Participants for the In-depth interview (IDI) were purposively selected. A semi-structured interview was conducted on the purposively selected participants based on their knowledgeable of the subject matter under investigation. Also some participants were purposively selected for FGD.

VII. RESULTS

Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Respondents by Socio-Demographic Characteristics

Gender	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Male	240	67.61
Female	115	32.39
Total	355	100
Age		
18 – 27	102	28.73
28 – 37	101	28.45
38 – 47	84	23.66
48 – 57	33	9.30
58 – 67	22	6.30
68 above	13	3.66
Total	355	100
Education		
Non-formal Education	66	18.59
Primary	27	7.61
Secondary	72	20.28
Tertiary	157	44.23
Vocational	22	6.20
Others	11	3.09
Total	355	100
Religion		
Christian	69	19.44
Muslim	272	76.62
Traditionalist	6	1.69
Others	8	2.25
Total	355	100
Ethnicity		
Kanuri	158	44.51
Hausa	67	18.87
Yoruba	20	5.63
Igbo	12	3.38
Others	98	27.61
Total	355	100
Marital Status		
Single	102	28.73
Married	211	59.44
Divorced	16	4.51
Separated	6	1.69
Widowed	20	5.63
Total	355	100
Occupation		
Civil Servant	64	18.03
Business	74	20.85
Farming	62	17.46
Artisan	20	5.63
Student	76	21.41
Unemployed	59	16.62
Total	355	100

Total		
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Field Survey, 2018

240 adult males (67.61%) and 115 adult females (32.39) participated in the survey. This difference in participation rate could be attributed to the influence of culture and/or religion of the people which does not allow women to be so much in the limelight.

Respondents ages 18 to 27 and 28 to 37 recorded highest participation rates of 28.73% and 28.45%, and the lowest participation rate was found among ages 68 years and above representing 3.6%. This indicates that the area has a high youth population from which the terrorist group readily recruits their members.

Most of the respondents were fairly well educated with 44.23% and 20.28% having tertiary and secondary education, respectively. Only 18.59% did not have any formal schooling. By this figure, it shows that people in the area are not illiterate as claimed at different times by different stakeholders.

Religious affiliation showed the preponderance of Muslims (76.62%), indicating little surprise why the Boko Haram sect who's agenda was to establish an Islam state, found the area a fertile ground to breed.

Majority of the respondents were of the Kanuri ethnic group, accounting for close to half (44.51%) of the total population of respondents. The second founder of Boko Haram, late Mohammed Yusuf, hailed from this ethnic group. This probably was an added advantage for him, as he went about propagating the group's Message of Islamizing Nigeria.

The survey showed that more than half of the respondents, 59.44% were married. 28.73% were single, while only 5.63% were widowed perhaps from lost of their husbands during one of Boko Haram's terror attacks.

The percentage distribution of respondents showed majority of them 74 (20.85%) engaged in business, 18.03% were civil servants, and 17.46% were into farming. Interestingly 76 students constituting 21.41% participated in the survey. 59(16.62%) respondents were unemployed. The data showed that majority of the residents of Maiduguri were business owners, which also indicated that Maiduguri is commercial city.

Table 2: Socio-Economic Effects of Military Operation against Boko Haram Terrorism in Maiduguri

Variable	Opinion							
	Strongly Agree		Agree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
Education The military operation against Boko Haram has affected education in the area, leading to school drop-outs among others.	120	33.80	81	22.82	69	19.44	85	23.94
Health There I Lack of access to basic necessities such as good health care delivery because of the military operation against Boko Haram.	150	42.25	118	33.24	15	4.23	72	20.284
Agriculture Military operation against Boko Haram has affected agricultural activities such as farming, fishing, etc.	3	70.14	93	26.20	11	3.10	2	0.56
Commercial Activities Military operation has affected banking, trade and investment opportunities as well as other business activities.	193	54.36	140	39.44	17	4.79	5	1.41
Transportation The operation has affected transportation system and free movement of people because of the cordon, stop and search exercise by the JTF.	96	26.48	232	65.35	15	4.23	14	3.94

Field Survey, 2018

Effect on Education

Opinions of respondent on how the operation of the military against Boko Haram affected education in Maiduguri were not markedly different. While 33.80% and 22.82% strongly agreed and disagreed, 19.44% and 23.94% disagreed and strongly disagreed.

Responses from the focus group discussion showed that most of the respondents were in agreement that the military operation had largely affected education in Maiduguri because of the use of the schools by the military who they argued should be kept in the barracks not in schools. The following response from an In-depth interviewee confirmed this position:

Yes, it has affected education because so many . . . were being closed for 3 years . . . the students are all staying at home without going to school, and most of the schools have soldiers staying inside rather than being in the barracks or the government should provide a place for them to stay. (IDI/Female)

One of the male respondents from the In-depth Interview session opined that for him, education had been the hardest hit by the operation of the military in Maiduguri. He stated:

Hmm, education in Maiduguri is the worse part being affected by this operation. Every government school was shot down automatically, so if you cannot take your child to private school that means your ward will remain at home till further notice, no education, no future for your child then. (IDI/Male)

Similarly a male participant in the FGD session stated:

I know of a certain school at Balori I, where right now, there are no students in it, only soldiers. It is used as a camp while there is a barrack. They soldiers should or are supposed to be kept in the barracks, but no, they are kept in such sites. They students are sent elsewhere and kept in some locations where it is not appropriate; thereby creating problems. (FGD/Male)

These assertions were corroborated by a female participant who expressed worry at parents' inability to send their wards to schools because the schools were being occupied by the military. She stressed:

In my opinion, parents are unable to send their children to school because the soldiers are staying there. They children are suffering in terms of schooling. However, they have contributed a lot to protect schools and students. (FGD/Female)

Further, one of the respondents opined saying:

The soldiers have dominated almost all the schools. The federal and state governments were aware of this. They relaxed and did not take any action. This has contributed to the set back in education. (FGD/Male)

A respondent who felt that the military had also done well in protecting the schools enthused:

The schools were closed because of Boko Haram. Now, they are opened since the coming of the soldiers. We thank the soldiers, they helped us! (FGD/Female)

Effect on Health

Respondents' opinion on the socio-economic effect of the military operation in terms of health of the people was quite revealing. The survey result showed that a total of 268(75.49%) agreed; while a total of 87(24.51%) disagreed. This however, was not the case with the respondents of the in-depth interview, who mostly expressed satisfaction with the performance of the military in terms of protecting health structures and facilities, in some instances providing medical care to the IDPs and other people in the area. For example, referring to how Boko Haram would have destroyed all the hospitals in Maiduguri if not for the presence of the military, one of the interviewee revealed:

As I know within Maiduguri and its environs, no any health infrastructure or facility was affected; the army are there to protect such places, if not for soldiers, this people will have destroyed our hospitals that exist; I commend the effort of the military in this aspect. (IDI/Male)

Concurring, another interviewee, remarked:

On the issue of health, of truth, the military have been very helpful. They do help us to procure drugs from the hospitals and bring to the IDP camps (FGD/Male)

However, a participant in the FGD had a contrary opinion:

In Maiduguri Municipal Council (MMC), many of the soldiers have impregnated our girls. They have contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS among the youths, most especially the ladies. (FGD/Female)

The participant cited an example to buttress her assertion, stating:

If you go to almost all the hospitals here, you will find girls of 8 to 13 years . . . out of ten . . . you find that about 7% are HIV carriers. This is the effect of the military operation. Before the coming of Boko Haram and the military operation against them, it was rare to find a girl of 12 years to 13 years being raped; and being found with such kind of virus. (FGD/Female)

Further, on the effect the military operation has had on the health of youths in Maiduguri, a male participant pointed to the increased use of drugs by the youths since the coming of the military to the area. He observed: The military have become friends with our youths. They teach so many of our youths how to take different kinds of drugs thereby making them to become drug addicts and social misfits. (FDG/Male)

Effect on Agriculture

The opinion of respondents on the effect of the military operation against Boko Haram on agriculture varied from one extreme to the other. The result showed that 70.14% strongly agreed that the action of the military had affected all aspects of agriculture, while only 0.56% expressed a strong disagreement. This indicated that military operation against Boko Haram had impact on agricultural activities.

This statistical information was also corroborated by respondents of the In-depth Interview (IDI) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD). For example, one interview respondent averred:

Yes, it has affected the agricultural sector in Maiduguri; I will sight an example of myself. I am a civil servant and a farmer as well. I have a very big farmland at . . . village which I inherited from my late father; I used to harvest beans and millet almost 100bags, but with the presence of soldiers at that place, we no longer have access to our farm, 4 years now, for no reason because there was no Boko Haram at that axis (IDI/Male)

On the contrary, another female interview contended that the military's operation did not have any kind of effect on agriculture, stating:

There is no effect of military operation on agriculture in Maiduguri. My father is a farmer and he continues his farming business up to today; but sometimes if he is going to the farm, it is the soldiers that will escort him in order to protect them from the Boko Haram people. (IDI/Female)

A participant in the FGD session who indicated his discontent with the military's action as it affected agriculture stated:

...the people are asked to vacate their lands because the military wants to stay there to carry out their operation. For instance there was a village with a population of about 200 to 300 who were asked to vacate their homes ... I don't think that is a good thing. (FGD/Male)

The same respondent added:

By fighting Boko Haram, the military bomb the area which affect the land and in turn makes the soil to become infertile. (FGD/Male)

Confirming the assertion by the male discussant, a female member of the group asserted:

As a result of the military operation, food prices have gone up; the poor are suffering; hunger is killing children. So, in the city today, you see the military themselves have turned their operation or exercise to a kind of business; they themselves now farm. They have come to collect farming from innocent civilians, instead of doing the work they are assigned to do. They harvest the produce of their (military) farm and take to their villages or home towns. (FGD/Female)

Effect on Commercial Activities

On how the military's operation had affected commercial activities in Maiduguri, majority of the quantitative survey respondents strongly agreed and agreed with 54.56% and 39.44% respectively. A marginal 4.79% and 1.41% of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed.

The results found support among the focus group participants, who opined that the military operation had affected commercial activities greatly in several ways from their inability to make withdrawal at ATMs to selling and buying of goods and provision of services. A male respondent who lamented on how the activities of the military had disrupted the businesses stated:

The military operation in Maiduguri has affected commercial and banking activities in one way or the other, because there was no business transaction as I think it is only when you make money that you will take to the bank and bank it. This has been affected due to low patronage of customers. Before people from Niger, Chad and Cameroon do come to Maiduguri to buy goods but since the inception of Boko Haram and the military operation things have turned upside down (IDI/Male)

Further, a respondent unequivocally corroborated the assertion by the interviewee above stating:

Truly, this operation affects our business. Being a trader I own a shop in Monday Market Maiduguri . . . at times when there is an attack by the Boko Haram people at the time there inside the town, when the soldiers come they will just start shooting everybody within the market area, kill so many and injure several; so this forced me to close my shop pending when peace returns. (IDI/Female)

A female respondent maintained:

In the area of commerce or trading, you see, the military will come and ask the business owner to give them some items, if the person refuses, they will capture the person or confiscate their wares. (FGD/Female)

In relation to banking, one of the male participants argued that the military actually were drafted into Maiduguri to protect the people from Boko Haram attacks, but that they had failed in their responsibility, otherwise, financial operations would be going on as usual. According to him:

The reason the military entered Maiduguri was because of Boko Haram. Then when they came . . . quite alright around about 2009 to 2010 . . . before we closed bank, it was 8 o'clock, but while now we close bank 2 o'clock, does it mean the soldiers have another time in terms of financial operations? They should win! They should win! (FGD/Male)

The same respondent was emphatic on this point, stating:

If the soldiers are there to protect lives and property, we are supposed to remain to operate bank from 8 o'clock to 8 o'clock or 10 o'clock. But today, banks will close at 2 o'clock. Why do we close at 2 o'clock if there is importance of the military operation against Boko Haram? (FGD/Male)

Another area of business that was affected like banking by the military operation according to the respondent was filing or fuel station operation. He maintained:

We cannot operate our filing stations from 8 o'clock to 11:30 p.m. because of the military operation. (FGD/Male)

Conversely, another participant sharing her view generally on the operation of the military against Boko Haram averred:

The military have helped us greatly. They are the ones who have protected us up to now. For me now that Boko Haram came back, if the soldiers were not here, they would have killed us by now. (FGD/Female)

Effect on Transportation

Transportation which includes the free movement of people, goods and services from one location to another has also been affected adversely by the military operation against Boko Haram in Maiduguri. This was evident from the information obtained from the questionnaire survey, the IDI, and FGD sessions. 232 respondents constituting 65.35% agreed that the operation by the military had effect on transportation generally.

This information was substantiated by IDI and FGD respondents who variously reported that the military operation, in which they block the roads, stop and search, had restricted their free movement as well as affected their businesses as they could not easily convey their goods including food items from the place of purchase to the points of sale or market.

According to one interviewee:

The military has turned this aspect into money making venture because if you are to travel to Yobe state from Maiduguri and you don't have an ID card, you must give N200 before you will be allowed to proceed on your journey; and any vehicle conveying goods they must give money too. Movement of people and goods was so terrible that time. (IDI/Male)

Similarly, a participant in the FGD session stated:

Military receive bribes from motorists at check points there making transport fare to go up, which in turn also results in increase in prices of goods and services. (FGD/Male)

Commenting on how military operation affected free movement of people in the area, a female interviewee noted:

The military operation in Maiduguri has affected transportation and movement of people, because at times you will not like to go out reason is once you are in a car or *keke napep*, the army will ask you to come down and raise your hand up and trek almost one kilometre without searching you or the car you are inside; if you are to reach your location in just 30 minutes, you will end up reaching there in two to three hours. (IDI/Female)

Admitting that the military's operation has affected the free movement of residents, another female interviewee reckoned that it became necessary to protect lives and property in the area. She stated:

Yes, it does a lot, but is for our own good and safety because you cannot make a halt kilometre within Maiduguri metropolitan without a stop and search by the soldiers because most a times, the Boko Haram do attack the soldiers at their checkpoint and shoot at them, that is why they restricted movement of vehicle and people anyhow. (IDI/Female)

Additionally, a participant in the FGD session grimly pointed:

. . . there is serious problem in terms of transportation because . . . our drivers drive safely . . . I use to say that the purpose of bringing the military into the north-east is because of the terrorists. If that be the case, their operation has affected our transportation, why because they have limited the number of vehicles that will be coming from the states to the local government and vice versa. For example, if you are to transport your goods from here to Gambia, it is a military officer that will give your permit or day that you will pass. It is unlike before the Boko Haram terrorism where it was free transportation from the local government to the states. That

is what has led to the increase in prices of our goods including food items. There was a time the military stopped transportation or travelling from Borno to Kano for about a year. (FGD/Male)

A female participant after sympathizing with the military for the manner in which some of them got killed by the terrorists, leaving relations behind, commended their efforts and urged them to do the needful, stating:

The military have tried. Most of them are being killed on a daily basis, leaving their wives behind. They help in providing security to transporters. For example, if 50 vehicles load from Bama to Maiduguri, they (military) will be informed through phone call that 50 vehicles have loaded. So, if peradventure, they discovered that the vehicles are more than 50, without their notice, they should open fire. (FGD/Female)

VIII. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This study was motivated by the need to ascertain the operations of the military against Boko Haram terrorism in Maiduguri and the impact of such operations on the socio-economic conditions of the people of the area. While empirical studies have shown that the military had been involved in unwholesome practices that were detrimental to the welfare of the people (Umar, 2013; Onuoha, 2014), military authorities have denied such allegations often times describing them as mere allegation aimed at tarnishing the image of the Nigerian military (Agbiboa, 2013).

However, findings from this study suggest that there is high level of dissatisfaction amongst the people with the action of the military which they described as non-beneficial to them, the people of Maiduguri. Majority of the respondents who participated in this study expressed varying degrees of dissatisfaction with the way and manner they were treated by the Nigerian military who engaged the Boko Haram terrorists.

The findings of this study indicated that agriculture which is the mainstay of the economy of Maiduguri and the State generally, was affected by the operation of the military which included bombing or shelling of Boko Haram hideouts. The exercise as reported by the respondents, affected community farm lands, family and inherited farmlands, personal farmlands, thereby rendering them infertile, and making it impossible for the people to farm any kind of crop whatsoever. As a result, too, the people lost their source of livelihood, became destitute, malnourished and sick. This is consistent with the findings of Odomovo, (2014), which indicated that the operations of JTFs which included bombing insurgents in civilian populated areas resulted in the death of innocent people and destruction of their homes and sources of livelihood.

The study found that the people were sometimes being denied access to cash withdrawals from ATMs, prevented or barred from doing their legitimate businesses such as buying and selling of goods and provision of services. This goes to confirm the positions of human rights organizations (HRW, 2013, AI, 2015) as well as some scholars (Osakwe and Audu, 2017) that people or civilians were being subjected to all kinds of inhuman treatments which included being raped, robbed of their properties or denied access to them, arrested, tortured, detained as well as extra-judicially executed.

Out of the five key areas investigated, education appeared to have been the hardest hit by the activities of the military in Maiduguri. The study found that most of the government schools in the area were being converted into barracks for use by the military; a situation that resulted in the closure of such schools and non-school attendance. Some of the IDI and Focus Group respondents reported that only the private schools were functioning, and that only parents who had the wherewithal could afford to send their wards to those schools, the poor parents would have to keep their wards at home. The entire scenario led to low school enrolment and drop outs.

Elsewhere, *The Syrian Network for Human Rights* also reported similar incidences where schools were being occupied by soldiers and some completely destroyed from bomb shelling, thus resulting in the collapse of the educational sector, and massive school drop outs in Syria (NGO Summary Report, 2016).

Findings of the study revealed that health and health infrastructures and facilities were not directly affected by the military operation, but it indirectly did. Contrary to the study by an NGO, *The Syrian Network for Human Rights* (2016) in which it reported how military operations against ISIL had destroyed hospitals and other health facilities in Syrian, the current study on military operation in Maiduguri, Nigeria found that hospitals in Maiduguri were safe but the youth population had been adversely affected in terms of their involvement in anti-social behaviours such as drug taking and peddling as had been introduced to them by soldiers. Some respondents of the In-depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion asserted that the military personnel had taught most of the youths how to take hard drugs thereby impacting negatively on their health. The respondents also reported that some of the young ladies in the area had become mothers (without husbands) as a result of their being impregnated by soldiers and afterwards abandoned by them only to return to their base.

The restrictions on transportation and movement of people, it was revealed, had a spiral down implications for agricultural activities, trade and commerce, among others. For example, most of the farmers had difficulty in moving their produce from the farms to the markets for sale. The study further discovered that commercial drivers too, suffered from the restrictions as they occasionally had to part with their hard earned money as bribes to the security personnel manning the roads. Mercy Corps (2017) had reported similar findings

in a study it conducted in the northeast (including Maiduguri) in which transporters suffered the consequences of restrictions on movement that involved mostly transportation of agricultural produce from across the borders into places such as Maiduguri.

The study found, as had been insinuated at different times by different stakeholders that some members of the elite class who included politicians, were complicit in the ongoing conflict in the north-east generally but Maiduguri in particular. This agrees with the main thrust of the conflict theory adopted in this study that the upper class or elites were originators of social conflict and at the same time its beneficiaries because of the tendency to exploit the masses, by power of force channeled through the military (Yakkaldevi, 2014).

IX. CONCLUSION

This study has shown that although the military operation against Boko Haram in Maiduguri has helped to restore relative peace and order, the gains have been outweighed by the negative effects of the operation, thus, registering a high level of frustration and disapproval from the general populace. It showed that every time the military tried to counter and curtail the terrorists, the civilian population tended to bear the brunt of the operation.

The study, therefore, concluded that instead of improving the socio-economic situation of the people of Maiduguri, in the specific areas of agriculture, commerce, health, education, and transportation, the military operation against Boko Haram terrorism has exacerbated it. Overall, the military operation against the terrorists has left the people frustrated and angry as demonstrated by one of the FGD participants who exclaimed “They should win! They should win!”

X. RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the in-depth investigation and findings, the study makes the following recommendations as panacea for addressing the effects of military operation against the Boko Haram terrorism in Maiduguri.

1. Education should be a priority of any nation desirous of social, economic and political development. The education sector in Maiduguri has been severely affected by the military operation as seen in the use of schools by the military as barracks. The government should make concerted efforts to build a common barrack(s) that would house all members of the Joint Task Force (JTF) so as to avoid a situation where government schools in particular are converted to some kind of barracks for residential and operational purposes. This would enable the children of the poor to have access to quality education and to grow up to become good citizens of their country.
2. Even though the findings of the study revealed that health was not actually affected directly by the military operation against Boko Haram, it is still incumbent on the government to ensure that the youths are protected from sexual and drug abuses by the military officials working in Maiduguri. Before any military official is posted to Maiduguri he/she should be screened of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted Infections. This would check the frequent cases of STIs among the youthful population. Also, any personnel of the JTF found to be involved in rape and the eventual transmission of HIV/AIDs to any youth or aged via solicited or unsolicited sex (as in rape) should be made to face the law.
3. On the effect of the military operation on agriculture, the study recommends that people whose farmlands were destroyed as a result of bomb shelling during military air raids, should be compensated by the government with new lands at no cost whatsoever. This would help to encourage the people to go back to farming and farming related activities. Security should be beeped up around farming communities so as to prevent attacks by Boko Haram. This would in the long run boost food production and other agro-based related activities.
4. Maiduguri being the commercial nerve centre of north-eastern Nigeria, has been hard-hit by the military operation that has been going on since 2009. This has resulted in declining commercial activities such as banking, trade and commerce as reported by respondents. The Federal and State Governments should constitute a special task force that would monitor the security personnel on duty at the banks, who were reported by respondents to have been involved in collection of part of the money they usually withdraw from ATMs. Those found wanting should be adequately penalized to serve as deterrence to others.
5. The mounting of road blocks and checkpoints undoubtedly helped to curb frequent attacks by the terrorists. But measures should be put in place to dissuade security personnel from collecting bribes from motorists, especially business people and traders, who ply the high ways. For example, there could be a monitoring task force that would periodically go round to monitor the activities of the JTF at check points during the day and night. The locals too, should be encouraged to report any untoward behaviour by any members of the JTF, by providing the people with telephone numbers that they could use for such purposes.

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